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Sentience is the most empirically sound basis for
the study of animal rights. Perhaps that is why this
attribute most often provides the foundation for
philosophical investigations of the ethical treatment
of animals. A number of psychological parameters
have been used to define sentience, and many
philosophers find these attributes intuitively and
rationally satisfying criteria with which to define the
limits of moral consideration. Mental experiences
which provide answerable questions for biological
experimentation and theory and a defensi~le basis
for moral consideration include pam and
consciousness. Given the early argument of Jeremy
Bentham, that upon introspection pain is the one
intrinsic evil that we can all agree upon, and the
contemporary philosophical arguments regarding the
moral relevance of pain in animals (Singer 1975,
1977, Fox 1977, Regan 1983), it would seem that
Clark (l977) is on safe ground in arguing that the
sparing of unnecessary pain is a minimum principle
of ethical behavior. Conscious thought is
fundamental to beings who have interests or lives
that can be made better or worse, and the inclusion
of a being within the scope of moral concern is often
predicated on the life of the being mattering to it
(Rollin 1981, Rachels 1983). It follows that painless
death of an organism without the capacity to think
of itself as a distinct entity is at worst a replaceable
loss of pleasure (Singer 1975, 1977). Thus extensive
and generally convincing arguments ground animal
rights and human obligations in sentience.,
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represents a significant oversight, in ~at inse~ts are
by far the most diverse (75% of all ammal species are
insects) and abundant (there are about 10 18 insects
alive at any moment or 200 million for each human
being) of any class of animals (Eisner and Wilson
1977). Insects provide a valuable tool for
investigations of sentience, although they have not
been as extensively studied as vertebrates. By
employing the comparative fields of anatomy,
morphology, physiology, neurophysiology and
behavior as well as considerations of theoretical and
evolutionary biology, there can be a rational
consideration of mental processes in insects and a
sound basis for their incl usion in our scope of moral
considerations.

Pain as a Criterion for Sentience
, Considerable empirical evidence exists to show
that a variety of invertebrates experience pain.
Alumets et al. (l979) reported that earthworms
possess B-endorphins and enkephlins which suggest
the capacity for pain by functional analogy. The
eminent insect physiologist,V. B. Wigglesworth

Although a great deal of biological research
relevant to sentience has been incorporated into
discussions of the ethical treatment of animals,
insects have not been addressed with more than a
passing acknowledgment, if that. This exclusion
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Griffin (1984) points out that if nonhuman
animals experience conscious thoughts or- subjective
feelings, we might be able to learn about them by
interpreting the signals by which they communicate
these thoughts and feelings to other animals. With
regard to insects, evidence indicates that these
animals, particularly social insects, engage in
thoughtful communication. Recruitment of weaver
ants, Oecophylla longinoda (Latreille), to join in a
fight exhibits a property not ordinarily found in
animal communication, namely, the conveying of
specific information about something the
communicator has not been exposed to directly but
has learned about only by receiving communicative
signals (Holldobler and Wilson 1978). Honeybees,
Apis mellifera L., do not use the chain of
communication of weaver ants but require first-hand
inspection of a resource before communicating
information about it (Lindauer 1971, von Frisch
1967). Bees use an elaborate form of symbolic
communication, the so-called "dance language." As
Jolly (1985) noted, this dance is the most precise and
abstract communication that any nonhuman animal
uses about the environment. This dance
communication includes information on distance,
direction, and desirability of food and potential nest
sites. In communicating information about and
eventually choosing a nest site, bees fulfill all of the
criteria for a deliberate decision in vertebrates (Jolly
1985). These and many more examples of insect
communication (Wilson 1971, Matthews and
Matthews 1978, Kerkut and Gilbert 1985)
demonstrate that insects exchange information,
discriminate among potential recipients, and use
appropriate channels under various conditions.

(1980), argued that insects experience visceral pain
as well as pain caused by heat and electrical shock,
while cuticular damage apparently causes no pain.
He based his conclusions on "observation and simple
reasoning," not intending to make an ethical
statement. In a careful and critical review of
physiological and behavioral methodologies,
Dawkins (1980) concluded that insects have the
capaci ty to suffer pai n. Eisemann et al. (1984)
contend that available evidence does not support the
occurrence of pain in insects, "such as occurs in
humans." Even with this carefully qualified
conclusion, Eisemann et al. (1984) suggested that
anesthetizing insects is desirable to guard against the
possibility of pain and to preserve an attitude of
respect towards living organisms. From an
evolutionary view, the awareness of pain is such an
enormously adaptive mechanism that it is
unreasonable to simply assume that it is unique to
humans. Pain may be expected in organisms whose
survival can be augmented by the experience of pain,
either as part of an escape mechanism or as a basis
for the capacity to learn from past experience
(Dawkins 1980), and insects certainly qualify in
these regards.

Consciousness as a Criterion of Sentience
Sentience can be defined in terms of the
consciousness of an organism. In turn, two
approaches have been taken to examine the biology
of consciousness: experimental and theoretical.
Experimental approaches usually use thinking as
evidence of consciousness. Theoretical approaches
deal directly with consciousness or consider
awareness as a basis for consciousness. Griffin (1976,
1984) has carefully examined both experimental and
theoretical evidence of consciousness in
invertebrates, although, like Wigglesworth's (1980)
considerations of pain, Griffin does not extend his
scientific arguments to ethics.

The second experimental criterion for thought is
problem solving. Machines may adequately perform
tasks in a predictable environment, but solving novel
challenges requires the process of thinking.
Honeybees provide two particularly relevant
examples of problem solving. Alfalfa anthers are
adapted for pollination by large insects, and the
anthers spring back violently when contacted by
honeybees. To solve this problem, honeybees learn
to avoid alfalfa until food becomes scarce and then
only visit the flowers whose anthers have already
been tripped or bite a hole in the back of the flower
to reach the nectar (Gould 1979, 1982). It may be
proposed that such behavior is genetically
programmed for just such cases, although this seems
to be a weak argument. A second example involves
the ability of individual bees to learn to visit an
artificial food source. While this capability is not
surprising, bees have a remarkable ability to solve an

Experimental Criteria of Consciousness
Three types of behavior have been used in regard
to the study of thinking: language, problem solving,
and learning. Graven (1967), Walker (1983),
Roitblatt et al. (1984), and Griffin (1976, 1984)
have presented and reviewed considerable evidence
for conscious thought in vertebrates based largely on
these types of behavior.
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by application of a general concept. It may be most
parsimonious to postulate an insect's conscious
efforts to match a template rather than to
hypothesize a set of neural specifications for motor
actions that will produce a characteristic structure
under all probable conditions. In any case, Occam's
razor does not exclude consciousness. Indeed it can
be argued that this scientific principle requires us to
accept the consciousness hypothesis as the simplest
of the competing explanations of complex instincts.

associated problem which would seemingly never
occur in nature. If a food source, whose location has
been learned, is moved, at first short distances and
later up to 30 m at a time, bees come to realize that
the food source is mobile. Individuals that visit it at
a given location will later search for it at an
extrapolated distance based on its previous
movements (Griffin 1984). In nature no food source
moves more than 30 m in a few minutes, and natural
analogies to this problem would be difficult to
invent. Thus, some insects can solve novel problems,
and at the very least the solutions represent new
applications of general concepts or abilities on the
part of the insect.

I·

A second theoretical consideration of insect
consciousness is one of morphology. Fortunately, we
have come a long way from Linnaeus' criteria for
insects, which included the absence of a brain
(Howse 1975). The central nervous system (CNS) of
insects is minute compared to even the smallest
mammal, but is consciousness a function of size and
neural complexity? Even the smallest insect brain
contains thousands of neurons, each anastomosing
with dozens of others. While the content and
complexity of conscious thoughts may be
proportional to the volume of the CNS, an absolute,
critical size necessary for thought is not supported by
our current understanding of the nature and
functioning of the CNS (Griffin 1984). The dogma
that only a concentrated dorsal nerve cord which is
enlarged at one end can support thought processes
has been advocated by Grene (1978) and Walker
(1983), despite considerable research which
indicates that it is the pattern of organization of
neurons and synapses that is critical to brain
function, not the gross morphology. Indeed, headless
insects can learn and exhibit memory (Alloway
1972), an accomplishment made possible by the
decentralization of mental processes to the ganglia
distributed along the central nerve cord. Hence, it is
unconvincing to argue that the morphology of the
insect CNS precludes conscious thinking. While
differences in behavioral complexity are apparent
between vertebrates and insects, there is no
indication of profound phylogenetic differences in
neurophysiology and brain function and no reason to
conclude that there are any qualitative differences.
Jung (1973) wrote that although he had believed
insects were merely reflex automata, 'We are.. .faced
with the fact that the ganglionic system apparently
achieves exactly the same result as our cerebral
cortex."

A number of insects have been shown to be
capable of learning under rigorous scientific
conditions; these include grain beetles, cockroaches,
locusts, wasps, ants, and flies (Alloway 1972, Panzo
1985, Eisenstein and Reep 1985). A three-volume
compendium edited by Coming et al. (1973-1975)
provides a comprehensive review of learning in
invertebrates. Although there is no debate over the
ability of insects to learn, and this capacity supports
the existence of mental processes in insects, learning
may not constitute sufficient evidence for thought.
While it is reasonable that entities that think also
learn, it is not as clear that all entities which learn
also think, e.g. computers.

Theoretical Evidence of Consciousness
While it is clear that insects learn, to deny the
importance of genetically predetermined behaviors
in these animals is absurd. Numerous behaviors have
been described and neurologically mapped as fixed
action patterns resulting from releasor stimuli
(Alcock 1979). The abundant role of instinct in
insects brings us to the first theoretical consideration
with regard to consciousness - the tacit assumption
that instincts are unconscious (e.g. Gould and Gould
1982).
In an Jnteresting consideration of complex
instincts, Griffin (1984) contends tha t structures
built by spiders and insects such as caddisfly larvae,
ants, wasps, and bees are not assembled by rote
instinct but via a template or a pattern within the
brain which the insect makes a conscious attempt to
match. In this way the problem of building structures
in extremely variable circumstances and repairing
unpredictable damage is not solved by a nearly
infinite number of preprogrammed contingencies but
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Social insects behave so as to meet the
communicated needs of the colony. One can
construct a system which awkwardly explains social
interactions such as food begging and tropholaxis
without including self-awareness. However, few
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species in practice, there is little agreement on the
theoretical basis of species. Species can be
conceptualized from evolutionary, ecological, and
reproductive perspectives, and these approaches are
not readily resolved by a single construct. Despite
the utility of taxonomic nomenclature to the
biological sciences (virtually every scientific article
in biological journals refers to one or more species of
animals), the species concept is, at best, a largely
arbitrary, discrete point forced on an underlying
continuum of relationship. Ghiselin's (1966, 1974)
treatment of species as individuals forms the basis for
Flower's (1986) recent argument that species (like
individuals) have rights. However, it is not clear how
species differ from demes, populations, races,
subspecies, genera, or any other group of organisms
that are spatiotemporally coherent entities made up
of component parts which are able to reproduce.
Moreover, it is clear that present evolutionary theory
treats individuals and species as very different
entities; the former is the unit of selection, the latter
is most certainly not (Alcock 1978, Wilson 1980).
Thus, an argument for protecting insect species is
necessarily confounded by unresolved theoretical
problems and, perhaps most importantly, by the
practical difficulties of actually identifying a group of
organisms as a species.

would argue that the social insects, and probably all
insects, lack awareness of outside events; they
behave according to environmental conditions, and
they demonstrate the ability to communicate
information about these conditions. Allowing that
an insect has awareness of external events but does
not have self-awareness is problematical. It is rather
implausible to contend that through sensory
mechanisms an insect is aware of the environment
and the needs of conspecifics, but through some
neural blockage the same insect is selectively
unconscious of sensory input about itself.

Moral Consideration of Species
Before developing an ethical standard for the
treatment of insects, it is necessary to address the
question of species' rights. In fact, insects exemplify
why species' rights are generally indefensible. Besides
the philosophical problems of finding a basis for
deriving unique rights for groups and the potential
for adverse consequences when subjugating the
individual to the (largely unknown) good of the
group, the very practical problem of actually defining
a species is epitomized with insects. Even if the rights
of species could be established, it is clear from
entomological literature that species are ill-defined,
essentially subjective, constantly changing entities
with little, if any, basis in biology other than
traditional convenience of organization and
expression.

A Proposed Ethic
Considerable empirical evidence supports the
assertion that insects feel pain and are conscious of
their sensations. In so far as their pain matters to
them, they have an interest in not being pained and
their lives are worsened by pain. Furthermore, as
conscious beings, insects have future (even if
immediate) plans with regard to their own lives, and
the death of insects frustrates these plans. In that
sentience appears to be an ethically sound,
scientifically viable basis for granting moral status
and in consideration of previous arguments which
establish a reasonable expectation of consciousness
and pain in insects, I propose the following,
minimum ethic:

The endless subdividing of species into sibling
species, subspecies, races, varieties and other "infra"
categories is a clear indication of the extraordinarily
difficult process of defining what constitutes an
insect species. In practice insect taxa are being
constantly revised, split, lumped, and renamed, with
frequent disagreements on whether a particular
group is systematically valid. Just a single example of
special interest to me is the Rocky Mountain locust,
which was identified as a species in 1866, was not
considered a distinct species in 1953, was resurrected
as a species in 1959, and currently is considered a
distinct species by some scientists but not by others
(Gurney 1953, Gurney and Brooks 1959, Capinera
and Sechrist 1982, D. Otte, personal communica
tion). A realistic attempt to apply rights to species
would lead to changing our ethical perspectives with
every taxonomic revision, or at least those which we
believe to be correct.

We ought to refrain from actions which may be
reasonably expected to kill or cause nontrivial
pain in insects when avoiding these actions has
no, or only trivial, costs to our own welfare.
A reasonable expectation of death or pain in
insects should be based on our intuition, experience,
and inference from what we know of other animals.

In addition to the problem of distinguishing
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of insects should determine the course of events. In
other words. the lives of insects and their interest in
not suffering pain override our interests in
convenience and expediency. The proposed ethic
can be applied to the areas of research/teaching and
technology.

Trivial pain is that which is extremely short in
duration or mild in degree (e.g. decapitation and
short term food/water deprivation). While many
animal rights advocates may find this ethic
understated, I believe that it is a philosophically
sound, scientifically defensible position from which
we can build further moral dialogue. Morality must
deal to some degree with what is; ethical principles
are not rational if they are not actualizable. Given
our sociopsychological milieu we cannot reasonably
expect to abolish the use of insects or other animals
in the development of new technologies and the
investigation of biological processes (nor perhaps
should we), but we can expect to perform scientific
work in such a way as to minimize. and where
possible avoid, killing and inflicting pain on the
organisms we study. Meaningful ethical progress will
be made if philosophers and biologists accept insects
as individuals of intrinsic value. warranting moral
consideration, and having some moral significance
which must be taken into account.

Application of the Proposed Ethic to Research
and Teaching
In regard to teaching and research the use of
anesthetics prior to dissection or other potentially
painful treatment of insects is ethically mandatory.
In many cases an anesthetic perturbs the system
under investigation no more than the induction of
pain. The only exception to the anesthetic rule
occurs when anesthetic is entirely contrary to the
goal of the procedure, and when the procedure is the
only method to answer a vital research question.
Courses in which students experiment on live insects
should include a discussion of insect pain if we
expect students to be ethically responsible. The work
edited by Westerlund (1982) is a useful resource in
this regard, although some sections demand a more
extreme ethic than proposed in this paper.

The proposed ethic shifts the burden of
justification onto those who engage in practices on
insects which can be reasonably expected to induce
nontrivial pain. For example, Wigglesworth (1980)
argued from observations that piercing the cuticle is
not painful to an insect but shock and heat are
painful. Such observations are useful, but more
rigorous studies would be beneficial. Scientific
approaches to investigations of animal suffering are
elaborated in Dawkins' (1980) work; her review
provides a rational starting place for considerations
of pain in nonhuman animals. Shifting the burden of
proof onto those who claim that a specific treatment
does not cause suffering immediately expands our
scope of moral consideration. This shift prevents
potentially horrendous mistakes in moral judgement
at the risk of overextending our moral concern. As
further work is done and historical barriers give way
to rational investigations of morally relevant
biological processes, if some insects are found to be
totally lacking in sentient capacities, we will have
committed no wrongs to have acted in an overly
humane fashion. Surely it is preferable to err on the
side of moral consideration than on the side of moral
exclusion.

As a general rule there is a considerable chance
for suffering when insects are overproduced in the
laboratory; in large colonies the needs of insects are
most easily overlooked. Excess insects and insects of
unneeded developmental stages are often allowed to
starve; such practices are morally indefensible. With
only trivial time and effort, excess insects can be
released (if this is feasible) or killed quickly if there is
insufficient food or other resources. Most insects
(and many other animals) can be reared in captivity
without inducing suffering, as evidenced by
physiological and behavioral information (e.g.
Lorenz 1952). While some animals do suffer from
captivity, laboratory reared insects. given ample
room for normal activities (which may be more
demanding for highly mobile species) and provided
with adequate environmental conditions, may be
better off then their feral counterparts.
A final consideration for both teaching and
research is the practice of insect collecting. A
great deal of research involves some collecting,
and insect collections are required in numerous
biology courses. Insect collecting may be justified
when it makes substantial contribution to our
understanding of insects or improves our ability to
protect our resources. In the context of this

While it is difficult to quantify sentience in other
animals and thereby know how to balance their
interests with ours, the proposed ethic can be applied·
to some clear examples. Even if insects are of
infinitesimal moral significance, where there is no
conflict with our own interests, other than simple
convenience or preferences. the moral significance
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prevent cosmetic damage which does not influence
the nutritional value of food becomes an issue; in
this case, we place greater moral significance ·on our
preference for visually appealing produce than on
the lives of millions of insects (and the condition of
the environment). Again, it seems difficult morally
to justify such practices.

justification the validity of both the process and
the quantities of insects collected as part of the
teaching process should be critically examined. At
the very least, both researchers and students
should abide by the guidelines adopted by the
Joint Committee for the Conservation of British
Insects (in New, 1984). Although their guidelines
do not specifically express moral concern for
insects, they do include commendably rigorous
standards for capture, killing, examination, and
release of insects.

When provided with various methods of pest
control, the moral consideration of insect life
becomes a relevant issue. The philosophical
foundations of integrated pest management (IPM)
are detailed in an historical perspective by Perkins
(1982). Entomologists are aware of moral
obligations; however, few have spoken out. Perkins
(1982) cites a recognition of the relationship
between ourselves and the natural world as a
principal consideration in the philosophical
development of pest management strategies. The
philosophical basis for IPM (as opposed to
eradication or purely chemical control) is the
recognition of humans as biological entities, firmly
embedded and thoroughly dependent on a complex
ecosystem in which we compete for resources. The
important distinction between this view and those
expressed by many ethicists is the instrumental value
(being good for something) of nonhuman life, which
apparently forms the basis for IPM, as opposed to the
intrinsic value (having a good in and of itself) of
nonhuman life which is the basis for the ethical
treatment of animals. There is a philosophical
relationship of IPM to the conservation movement:
both are founded on a concern for our own well
being. However, this generalization should not be
applied to all of the proponents of IPM; in fact, there
are those such as Pimentel (1971), Pimentel et al.
(1978), Metcalf (1980), and undoubtedly others who
express concern over our treatment of other animals
without the anthropocentric trappings of IPM.
Pimentel's consideration of "external costs" includes
concern for wildlife and natural vegetation without
an immediate reference to the impact of these
entities on the human condition. Rabb (in Perkins
1982) has spoken directly to our moral obligations in
recognizing that living things warrant moral
consideration, "The use of [technological] power is a
tremendous responsibility and must be done without
arrogance and with a subtle sensitivity, if not a
reverence, for the value of all life."
0

Teachers and researchers must recognize the
capacity of insects to suffer and then choose
procedures and experimental designs which
minimize, and where possible avoid, the infliction of
nontrivial pain. When a particular option
accomplishes this goal at no or minimal cost to our
welfare and that of other sentient beings, we are
morally compelled to choose that option above all
others.

Application of the Proposed Ethic to
Technology
In terms of insect control practices most people,
including myself, would contend that even millions
of insects are of less moral significance than a single
human life. Clark (1977), Singer (1977), Rollin
(1981), Regan (1983), Scanlon (1983), and most
other ethicists defend the protection of our food
from insect damage. We have very good reason to
believe that overriding the interests of certain pest
species prevents vastly greater harm to ourselves.
Singer (1977) contends that it is not arbitrary to
hold that humans with self-awareness, abstract
thought, plans for the distant future, and complex
communication are of greater value than organisms
without such capacities in kind or degree. It is not
counter to the goals of agriculture to acknowledge
the validity of the statement made by Maclver
(1948), "If I tread on a woodlouse, I do wrong... but
it is only a very small wrong, and to exaggerate its
wrongness is sentimentality. If I kill a Colorado
beetle, I do wrong by the beetle, but if I fail to kill it,
I do wrong by all the growers and consumers of
potatoes." However, the lives of millions of insects
are not so easily discounted when compared to the
moral significance of a tobacco field or of a housing
development. Indeed, the control of insects on crops
which are themselves damaging to human welfare,
e.g. tobacco, is difficul t to defend from a moral
standpoint. Similarly, the control of insects to
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